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Three criteria for evaluating the possible performance of water resource systems are discussed. 
These measures describe how likely a system is to fail (reliability), how quickly it recovers from failure 
(resiliency), and how severe the consequences of failure may be (vulnerability). These criteria can be 
used to assist in the evaluation and selection of alternative design and operating policies for a wide 
variety of water resource projects. The performance of a water supply reservoir with a variety of 
operating policies illustrates their use. 
INTRODUCTION 
The ability of existing and proposed water resource sys- 
tems to operate satisfactorily under the wide range of 
possible future demands and hydrologic conditions is an 
important system characteristic. The likely performance of 
water resource systems is often described by the mean and 
variance of benefits, pollutant concentrations, or some oper- 
ating variable. This paper develops additional performance 
criteria that capture particular aspects of possible system 
performance which are especially important during periods 
of drought, peak demands, or extreme weather. The pro- 
posed criteria are called reliability, resiliency, and vulnera- 
bility. These performance measures should be useful in the 
selection of water resource system capacities, configura- 
tions, operating policies, and targets. 
Bayesian methods are one natural and rigorous way of 
dealing with the uncertainty which arises in many planning 
studies. Davis et al. [1972] and Benjamin and Cornell [1970] 
review the basic methodology. When Bayesian analysis is 
combined with multiattribute utility theory [Keeney and 
Raiffa, 1976], the analysis can incorporate the variability in 
system performance and uncertainty in planning parameters 
with a single decision maker's attitudes toward risk. Exam- 
ples of the use of multiattribute utility theory in water 
resources planning are given by Keeney and Wood [1977], 
Goicoechea et al. [1979] and Krzysztofowicz and Duckstein 
[1979]. 
Unfortunately, there are several drawbacks to this meth- 
odology. In particular the method requires the development 
of a utility function which incorporates a decision maker's or 
society's tradeoffs between competing system attributes and 
also their attitudes toward risk. Not only is such a function 
very difficult to construct for a single identified 'decision 
maker,' but such a function will probably not reflect the 
priorities of all groups having significant influence on the 
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public decision-making process [Loucks et al., 1981, pp. 
137-138]. Starr and Whipple [1980] discuss the differences in 
risk preferences exhibited by society and by individuals. 
The multiobjective multiple-decision-maker character of 
public decisions is widely recognized, and multiobjective 
planning algorithms have been developed [Cohon, 1978]. 
The value of a multiobjective framework in water resources 
planning is that the benefit and disbenefit bundle associated 
with alternative projects and proposals can be better identi- 
fied. As a result, the public as well as different participating 
public agencies and interest groups can better evaluate 
proposed projects using their own unarticulated objectives. 
Advocated here is the inclusion of special risk-related 
system performance criteri a within the multiobjective analy- 
sis of alternatives. By adding these performance measures to 
those already used to describe the expected costs and 
benefits of projects, individuals and groups should be better 
able to understand how a project might perform in the 
uncertain future. If they better understand how water re- 
source systems may operate and how unpleasant any periods 
of unsatisfactory performance may be, individuals will be 
prepared to make better decisions. 
Of interest are system performance criteria which are 
suitable for characterizing the stochastic and dynamic per- 
formance of such water resource systems as wastewater 
treatment plants, multireservoir water supply systems, or 
flood-flow forecasting and control systems. Some recent 
work on the properties of ecological systems is relevant to 
this problem. 
Holling [1973] used the concept of resilience to describe 
the ability of a dynamic multispecies ecological system to 
persist with the same basic structure when subjected to 
stress. Resilience is to be contrasted with stability, which 
pertains to the variability of species densities over time. 
Holling points out that some systems may appear to be 
unstable because population densities vary over wide 
ranges. However, such systems may be very resilient, for 
they can persist after severe shocks or during periods of 
stress because of their capacity to accommodate variability 
in individual •pecies densities. Very stable systems may not 
be able to cope with large variations in population densities. 
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They may disintegrate if hey suffer large losses due to fire or 
disease, the introduction of a new pollutant, or a radically 
new manageihent strategy. 
Later work has extended this idea to environmental/ 
ecosystem management [Fiering and Holling, 1974; Holling, 
1978]. These authors question the wisdom of management 
strategies which force natural systems to be highly stable. 
Enforcing stability may result in changes in the structure of 
managed systems which could greatly reduce their resil- 
ience. For example, enhancement of salmon spawning 
should lead to more productive fisheries and, as a result, 
greater fishing pressure. However, this greater pressure is 
very likely to cause the less productive stocks to become 
extinct or nearly so. This would leave the fishing ecosystem 
precariously dependent on a few artificially enhanced spe- 
cies [Larkin, 1979]. 
Several individuals have applied similar ideas to water and 
land related resource systems management. Hairnes and 
Hall [1977] introduce several criteria for describing the 
characteristics of system models and planning situations. 
Fiering [1976, 1977] has developed measures of resilience 
which can be useful in water resource planning. Hashirnoto 
[1980a,b] and Hashirnoto et al., [this issue] have advanced 
the idea of syhtem robustness, in which robustness describes 
the possible deviation between the actual costs of a proposed 
project and those of the least cost project design. 
MEASURES OF SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 
In many studies the operational status of a water resource 
system can be described as either satisfactory or Unsatisfac- 
tory. The occurrence of unsatisfactory performance will be 
described in this paper as a failure. A failure could corre- 
spond to the actual structural failure of a dam from a 
catastrophic flood event or an earthquake [Mark and Stuart - 
Alexander, 1977]. The modes of failure of concern here are 
less severe and more common. A failure may be a 50-year or 
200-year flood event which may cause extensive but not 
catastrophic flooding, moderate and severe droughts which 
make it impossible for rese•oir systems to meet contractual 
obligations, or unexpected peaks in demand which tax water 
supply and wastewater treatment systems. 
A number of indicator s can be used to describe the 
possible performance of water resource systems. Simple and 
frequently used measures of system performance are the 
mean and variance of system outputs and performance 
indices. While the mean and variance of such quantities as 
project net benefits or DO concentrations in rivers are useful 
statistics, they are often not sufficient. In particular, the 
mean and variance describe th e average level and average 
squared deviation from the mean of the parameters in 
question. These statistics provide a very vague description 
of just how poorly a system might behave in the infrequent 
situation when a failure does occur. The DO concentration in 
a river or the BOD removal rate in a wastewater treatment 
plant may be satisfactory 360 days a year. However, our 
primary concern may be the 5 days when things go wrong 
and aquatic communities might be seriously degraded (at 
least temporarily). For example, our attention should not be 
focused exclusively on the 10-year, 7-day low flow as things 
can be worse in critical parts of the fiver with the minimum 
1-year, 7-day low flow due to the increased flow rates 
(Loucks et al. [1981], pp. 527-528, provide an example). 
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Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the inability of the mean and 
variance by themselves to define how severe and how 
frequent periods of poor performance may be. The figures 
contain a time history of the performance of two possible 
systems. The mean and variance of the performance parame- 
ter is the same in both cases over •he time period shown. In 
fact, the curves are mirror images across their mean level. 
Howevei', the performance history in Figure 1 displays two 
periods where performance clearly fell below the perform- 
ance standard. This is never the case for the performance 
history in Figure 2. 
When summarizing the values of performance parameters 
by their mean and variance, it is also difficult to determine if 
an improvement in the mean accompanied by an increase in 
the v•,'iance is an overall improvemeiat. Theory addressing 
the relative tradeoff between the mean and variance of risky 
investments is well developed for small risks [Pratt, 1964]. 
Howeve r, if performance is highly variable or if the Conse- 
quences of poor performance are severe, then it is appropri- 
ate and desirable to employ risk descriptors which (unlike 
the mean and variance of a parameter) describ e in clear and 
meaningful terms what the character of failures might be. 
Our analysis of system performance focuses on system 
failur e, defined as any output value in violation of a Perform- 
ance threshold (such as a•performance standard or a contrac- 
tual Obligation). System performance can be described from 
three different viewpoints' (1) how often the system fails 
(reliability), (2) how quickly the system returns to a satisfac- 
tory state once a failure has occurred (resiliency), and (3) 
how significant the likely consequences of failure may be 
(vulnerability). Descriptive as well as mathematical defini- 
tions of these criteria follow. 
The definitions of these criteria re formulated assuming 











Fig. 2. Variable system peformance without failures. 
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tion can be describea by a stationary stochastic process. 
That is, the probability distributions that describe the output 
time series do not change with time. Of course this is only an 
approximation of reality but it is often quite reasonable. For 
instance, the probability distribution of streamflows at a 
particular site may change over time due to climatic shifts or 
land use changes in the drainage area. Still, it is both 
convenient and satisfactory in many cases to assume that 
streamflows are a stationary process over typical planning 
horizons. 
Reliability 
Denote a system's output state or status by the random 
variable Xt at time t, where t takes on discrete values 1, 2, 3, 
ß ß ß. In general, the possible values of Xt can be partitioned 
into two sets' $, the set of all satisfactory outputs, and F, the 
set of all unsatisfactory (failure) outputs. At any time t the 
system output is assumed to be an element of one of these 
sets. The reliability of a system can be described by the 
frequency or probability a that a system is in a satisfactory 
state: 
a = Prob [Xt • S] (1) 
An alternate definition of reliability not adopted here is that 
reliability is the probability that no failure occurs within a 
fixed period of time, often taken to be the planning period. If 
the planning period is a single period, then the two defini- 
tions are equivalent. 
Reliability is a widely used concept in water resources 
planning. Reliability is sometimes taken to be the opposite of 
risk. That is, the risk or probability of failure is simply one 
minus the reliability a. Both reliability and this definition of 
risk do not describe the severity or likely consequences of a 
failure. The possible severity of failures can be described by 
other criteria, such as resiliency and vulnerability. 
Resiliency 
Resiliency will describe how quickly a system is likely to 
recover or bounce back from failure once failure has oc- 
curred. ff failures are prolonged events and system recovery 
is slow, this may have serious implications for system 
designß One would like to design systems which can recover 
and return to a satisfactory state rapidly. 
Resiliency may be given a mathematically precise defini- 
tion. Let Tr be the length of time a system's output remains 
unsatisfactory after a failureß The resiliency of a system can 
be defined as the inverse of the expected value of Tr. To 
derive a mathematical expression for that expected value, let 
Zt = l Xt • S 
Zt = O XtGF 
Then (l/n) Y•t= 1 n Zt is the fraction of time from period t = 1 to 
t = n that the system output or performance is satisfactory. 
In the long run this fraction approaches the probability of the 
performance being satisfactory, and hence equals system 
reliability: 
unsatisfactory state: 
Wt = l Xt • S 
Wt = 0 otherwise 
X•+l GF 
In the long run the mean value of Wt will equal the 
probability p of the system being in the set S in some period t 
and going to the set F in the following period: 
n 
p=Prob{Xt•S, Xt+•F}= lim 1 • Wt 
t=l 
(3) 
The average sojourn time in the unsatisfactory or failure 
states during an n-period experiment is' 
(4) 
where A is the total time in F and B is the number of times 
the process went into F. Hence 
•r= I (1 -Zt) Wt 
n t=l t=l 
(5) 
As n approaches infinity, the average sojourn time •F will 
approach its mean value (1 - a)/p. Thus the expected length 
of tim• that the system's output or performance remains 
unsatisfactory once it becomes unsatisfactory equals 
E[Tr] - (6) 
This defines the average number of time periods a failure is 
expected to last once it has occurred. The inverse of this is 
the system's average recovery rate and is our measure of 
resiliency: 
p Prob {Xt • S and Xt+• • F} 
y - = (7) 
1 - a Prob {Xt • F} 
In the long run, the number of transitions from satisfactory 
states in S to unsatisfactory states in F must equal the 
number of transitions in the reverse direction: 
Prob {Xt • S and Xt+• • F} = Prob {Xt • F and Xt+• • S} 
(8) 
Hence 7 is equivalent to the average probability of a 
recovery from the failure set in a single time step: 
Prob {Xt • F and Xt+• • S} 
Prob {Xt • F} 
= Prob {Xt+• • S IXt • F} (9) 
lim - Zt = a (2) 
t=l 
, 
Let Wt indicate a transition from a satisfactory to an 
Note that if the occurrence of a failure Xt • F and a 
subsequent success Xt+• • S are probabilistically indepen- 
dent events, then ,/would reduce to Prob {Xt+• • S}, which 
is our measure of reliability. 
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Vulnerability 
Here vulnerability refers to the likely magnitude of a 
failure, if one occurs. Even when the probability of failure is 
small, attention should be paid to the possible consequences 
of failure. Hailing [1978] discusses the idea of safe-fail as 
opposed to fail-safe. Attempts to maximize system reliability 
are attempts to make a system's operation failure-free. Still, 
few systems can be made so large or so redundant that 
failures are impossible. Even when it is possible to raise 
levees high enough or make water supply reservoirs large 
enough that failure is hard to imagine, it is often not 
economical to do so. After a point, effort is better expended 
making the consequences of failure less severe and more 
acceptable than in trying to eliminate the possibility of failure 
altogether. Early warning systems, flood insurance, and 
flood-proofing of structures are three approaches to decreas- 
ing the costs of flooding when floods do occur. Likewise, the 
exclusion of buildings from floodways and the use of flood- 
prone areas for parks, natural areas, and agriculture are 
other means of minimizing the costs of floods. 
It is important to realize that efforts to maximize system 
efficiency and reliability can actually increase a system's 
vulnerability to costly failure should failure occur. Transfor- 
mation of traditional agricultural systems to high yield 
single-species crops sets the stage for disaster should a new 
crop disease or pest develop. Likewise, flood control reser- 
voirs and levees that control small floods create an image 
and sense of security; as a result, unwise development in 
partially protected areas can occur. This creates the poten- 
tial for large losses should a large flood occur or a levee 
break. Replacement of small unreliable wastewater treat- 
ment plants by large well-managed regional facilities may 
decrease the frequency of plant failures, yet by concentrat- 
ing the total treated wastewater flow in a single location, the 
impact and consequences of a breakdown in the biological 
oxidation process will be greatly magnified should the plant 
be overloaded or receive a slug of concentrated or toxic 
material [Adams and Gemmell, 1980]. 
The loss of a rear cargo door on the DC-10 aircraft due to 
improper latching provides an excellent illustration of fail- 
safe versus safe-fail design. The blow out of the cargo door 
at high altitudes causes a rapid decompression of the cabin 
and the severing of control cables by the collapse of the floor 
separating the cabin and lower storage area. Commercial 
airlines emphasized design modifications and safety proce- 
dures to prevent such mishaps. Unfortunately, a failure 
occurred and many died. In some military aircraft, holes 
were cut in the floor separating the two •ompartments, 
allowing rapid decompression of the cabin should the cargo 
door be lost. This prevented structural damage to the aircraft 
and made the planes 'safe in failure.' 
It is important that decision makers be aware of the 
vulnerability of a system to severe failure should a failure 
occur. This should be an important criterion in water re- 
source system design and selection. To construct a mathe- 
matical index of system vulnerability, assume that the sys- 
tem performance variable Xt can take discrete values x•, 
ß '', Xn. TO construct a quantitative indicator of system 
vulnerability to severe failure should a failure occur, assign 
to each discrete failure state xj G F a numerical indicator of 
the severity of that state, denoted sj. Furthermore, let ej be 
the probability that xj, corresponding to sj, is the most 
TABLE 1. Characteristics of River Flows 
Winter Summer Annual 
Mean flows, x 10 7 m 3 4.0 2.5 6.5 
Standard deviation, x 10 7 m 3 1.5 1.0 2.3 
Correlation of flows: winter with following summer, 0.65; summer 
with following winter, 0.60. 
unsatisfactory and severe outcome that occurs in a sojourn 
into the set of unsatisfactory states F. Then ej equals Prob 
{xj, corresponding to sj, is the most severe outcome in a 
sojourn in F}. One reasonable metric for overall system 
vulnerability would be the expected maximum severity of a 
sojourn into the set of unsatisfactory states: 
v= • sjej (10) 
j•F 
Here emphasis is placed not on how long failure persists (the 
inverse of resiliency) but on how bad things may become. 
REL!ABILITY, RESILIENCY, AND VULNERABILITY 
OF A WATER SUPPLY RESERVOIR 
Use of the reliability, resiliency, and vulnerability con- 
cepts is illustrated with a reservoir operation problem. For a 
reservoir of given capacity the reservoir operating policy 
determines the reliability, resiliency, and vulnerability of a 
water supply system. Kitson [1979] emphasized the need in 
reservoir operating policy development to consider reduc- 
tions, during drought periods, in the amount of water avail- 
able. He stated that this need leads to 'the concept of 
expressing reliability in terms of the frequency, duration and 
intensity with which restrictions have to be placed on water 
consumption.' Velikanov [ 1979], referring to irrigation water 
use, pointed to the necessity of evaluating in probabilistic 
terms system performance under conditions of both exces- 
sive and deficient water availability. 
The reservoir operation example presented by Loucks et 
al. [1981, pp. 138-152] is used here to illustrate the use of 
risk-related system performance criteria. In that example a 
small reservoir with capacity 4 x 10 7 m 3 wasto provide 4.5 
X 10 7 m 3 of water to meet summer irrigation needs. The 
logarithms of the inflows to the reservoir were modeled with 
a Thomas-Fiering model which reproduced the mean and 
variance of flows in each of two seasons and the season to 
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Water available during summer, S + I (x IO?m •)
Fig. 3. Standard operating policy for initial storage S and inflow I 
obtained by minimizing the expected loss E[It•(R)] for/• = 1. 
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Fig. 4. Optimal summer release policy for/3 = 3. The lines how 
best value of release Ras a function of initial storage S plus inflow I 
for specified value of S and release target T. 
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Fig. 5, Optimal reservoir summer elease for/• = 3 as a function of 
initial storage and total summer inflow, 
season correlation of the flows (Loucks et al., 1981, pp. 141, 
283-284,305-307). The values of the statistics describing the 
relevant hydrology are given in Table 1. It was also neces- 
sary to release 0.50 x 107 m 3 of water during the wet season 
to satisfy minimum flow requirements. 
The steady state operation of this simple system was 
simulated with a range of summer season operating policies. 
The winter operating policy was always to release 0.50 x 107 
m3 of water if possible and to store as much of the excess 
water as the reservoir could hold. The: summer season 
operating policies were derived by stochastic dynamic pro- 
graming [e.g., Loucks et al., 1981, pp., 324-331] with the 




T target release of 4.5 x 107 m 3; 
R summer season release; 
l•(R) = 0, when R > T; 
l•(R) - [(T- R)/T] •, when R < T. 
The exponent /3 defines the shape of the loss function 
lo(R), A range of/3 values between 0 and 7 were considered 
to provide a range of policies. In the optimization, inflows, 
and storage volumes in each season were discretized in units 
of 0.25 X 10 7 m 3. Optimal policies were a function of initial 
summer storage and the actual summer period inflow. 
Note that the parameter/3 is an artificial device introduced 
to facilitate the generation of operating policies which reflect 
different tradeoffs between shortfall magnitudes and failure 
frequency and hence different tradeoffs among reliability, 
resiliency, and vulnerability. 
For /3 = 1, one obtains the 'standard' operating policy 
shown in Figure 3. In the figure, I denotes the summer 
inflow. The standard policy meets as much of the demand 
target as possible. 
For /3 > 1, operating policies exhibit 'hedging" they 
sometimes provide only a portion of the target release, when 
in fact all or at least more of the target volume could be 
provided. (Klerneg [1977] and Stedinger [1978] discuss this 
phenomena.) This saves water to protect against future 
deficits which could be even larger. This is illustrated by the 
policy in Figures 4 and 5, obtained with/3 = 3. 
In Figure 4, several operating curves are discontinuous 
because they are defined over only a portion of the initial 
Storage plus inflow (S +/) axis. For example, if the initial 
summer storage is S = 3, then the only legitimate values of S 
+ I are those greater than or equal to 3. As the two figures 
show, the optimal policy for/3 = 3 can result in large and 
unnecessary deficits when the current summer inflow is 
below normal levels. To incur such deficits is optimal for the 
specified loss function, for it minimizes the expected value 
of immediate and possible future losses which could occur if 
streamflows remain below normal. 
For /3 < 1, a very different operating policy behavior 
results. In this case the marginal disutility of deficits is a 
decreasing function of the total deficit. As a result, optimal 
policies always meet the entire target if this is possible but 
sometimes fail to release any water at all when a modest 
failure is already unavoidable. Such a policy for/3 = 0.50 is 
displayed in Figures 6 and 7. 
In the limit as /3 approaches zero, the loss function 
becomes 
/0(R) = 0 R- > T 
/0(R) = 1 R<T 
In this instance the optimal policy is to meet the summer 






,-7/ /,?g, , , 
Water available during summer, $ + I (x IO?m 3) 
Fig. 6. Optimal summer release policy for/• = 0.5. The lines 
show best value of release R as a function of available water S + I 
for specified values of initial storage S. 
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Fig. 7. Optimal reservoir summer release for/3 = 0.5 as a function 
of initial storage and total summer inflow. 
little water as one can if a failure cannot be avoided. This 
maximizes system reliability by saving water to avoid possi- 
ble future failures when a failure in the current period is 
already unavoidable. 
With each policy the reservoir-irrigation system was simu- 
lated for 10,000 years to determine (1) the reliability a with 
which the summer irrigation target was met, (2) the resilien- 
cy •/of the system equal to the reciprocal of the average 
length of sequences of failure years, and (3) the vulnerablity 
v of the system equal to the average of the maximum deficit 
that occurred in each sequence of failure years. A failure 
year occurred whenever the summer release R was less than 
the target release T, equal to 4.5 x 107 m 3. 
Figure 8 illustrates the values of system reliability a, 
resiliency % and vulnerability v as a function of /3, the 
exponent in the loss function used to derive the various 
operating policies. As /3 increases, the penalty on large 
deficits becomes increasingly severe. As a result, as /3 
increases, system reliability a decreases because the optimal 
policies incorporate a propensity to incur small deficits so as 
to minimize the expected loss from larger deficits at later 
times. 
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Fig. 8. System reliability, resiliency, and vulnerability as a func- 
tion of parameter/3 used to derive operating policies. 
TABLE 2. Reliability and Expected Losses Achieved With Oper- 
ating Policies Derived with Different Values of/3. 
Reliability Expected Value of Three Loss 
/3 Used of System Functions 
to Derive Operation, 
Policy ot E[I](R)] E[I•,(R)] E[15(R)] 
0 0.93 6.6 6.5 6.1 
0.25 0.91 4.2 2.7 1.47 
0.50 0.89 3.2 2.0 0.98 
0.75 0.87 2.6 1.04 0.31 
1.00 0.87 2.5* 0.76 0.062 
1.50 0.79 2.6 0.70 0.051 
2.00 0.62 3.5 0.67* 0.040 
3.00 0.41 5.3 0.79 0.027 
5.00 0.19 9.1 1.37 0.022* 
7.00 0.15 12.4 2.2 0.029 
*Note that minimum value of E[lk(R)] is achieved at/3 = k because 
the policy derived with given/3 by construction minimizes E[lts(R)]. 
Resiliency generally shows the same trend as reliability. 
For/3 = 0, system resiliency is high and sequences of failure 
years are very short. Deficits are very severe, often equaling 
the entire target. For/3 >- 3, resiliency is low because periods 
of failure can be very long, although deficits are often small. 
The vulnerability trend is different from that obtained with 
the other risk-related performance criteria. It achieves its 
maximum at/3 = 0 when almost every failure is a complete 
failure. It then decreases with increasing /3 to achieve a 
minimum at /3 = 2. Above /3 = 2, vulnerability actually 
increases with increasing/3. This occurs because operating 
policies derived with large /3 will frequently incur deficits 
much larger than is necessary. This saves water as a hedge 
against the possibility of even larger deficits in future peri- 
ods. This tradeoff (for/3 > 2) decreases the reliability and 
resiliency as well as the vulnerability of the system's per- 
formance. Still, it is optimal with respect to each policy's 
loss function. This is shown by Table 2, which reports the 
value of the expected loss function E[Io(R)] for/3 = 1, 2, and 
5. 
The values of reliability, resiliency, and vulnerability in 
Figure 8 reveal some of the characteristics of reservoir 
system performance that can be obtained with reservoir 
policies that minimize the specified loss functions. Realistic 
policies probably correspond to/3 in the range of 1.0-2.0 and 
hence would have high reliability, modest resiliency, and 
close to minimal vulnerability. Figure 9 provides a more 
explicit description of the unavoidable tradeoff between 
vulnerability and reliability. One cannot have both the 
maximum possible reliability and minimum possible vulnera- 
bility. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In general, there exist tradeoffs among expected benefits, 
reliability, resiliency, and vulnerability. Use of the three risk 
criteria improves our ability to describe how often failures 
may occur, how long periods of unsatisfactory performance 
are likely to last, and just how severe failure might be. This 
was illustrated with a water supply reservoir example. 
There, high system reliability was accompanied by high 
system vulnerability. This information should be used to 
supplement other standard project evaluation criteria, in- 
cluding the distribution of project benefits and costs as well 
as various social and environmental impacts. By using 
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Fig. 9. Tradeoff between system reliability and vulnerability for/3 
between 0.25 and 2.5. 
improved descriptions of the possible nature of poor system 
performance, should it occur, individuals should be able to 
better understand the risks to which they are exposed by 
various project and no-project alternatives. 
The particular mathematical definitions advanced here for 
resiliency and vulnerability should be viewed as illustrative 
examples. Every planning situation is in some way unique 
and calls for creativity in the definition of appropriate 
performance descriptors, such as resiliency, reliability, and 
vulnerability. It is unlikely that a single mathematical defin- 
tion of these concepts will be appropriate or useful in all 
situations. However, recognition and description of the 
possibility of low-probability but undesirable consequences 
of alternative plans should be an important component of the 
planning process. Hence engineers and planners need to 
develop appropriate quantitative risk criteria that describe 
the undesirable events that individuals may experience as a 
consequence of particular investment or operating policy 
decisions. 
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